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Abstract:

Just as China’s factories disrupted the economics of IT hardware, its research labs
have the potential to disrupt the economics of the technology itself. In 2014, China’s
patent office received nearly 2.4 million patent applications, 93% from domestic applicants. China has also climbed to third place in terms of international applications,
with over 21,000 WIPO PCT applications. Meanwhile, China has taken an assertive
role in setting technology standards, both at the national and international levels. In
the past, this has included developing and promoting alternatives to important IT
standards as a means of challenging perceived monopolies by certain (foreign-dominated) technologies. More recently, China’s 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law and 2014 Regulatory Measures on National Standards Involving Patents have codified a national
policy aversion to closed standards. China’s burgeoning patent portfolio, providing
currency to negotiate into and around multinational patent pools, combined with the
impact of its policies on standards-setting norms, could shift the economics of patent
monetization in dramatic ways, foremost by putting downward pressure on royalty
rates. Like previous market disruptions, China’s effect on the global knowledge economy is likely to challenge some foreign firms and benefit others.

I. Introduction
In 2014, China’s patent office received nearly 2.4 million patent applications. 93%
were from domestic applicants. China has also climbed to third place in terms of
international applications, with over 21,000 WIPO PCT applications.
China’s rise to its position as the “World’s Factory”1 shifted manufacturing
capacity away from developed countries2 but more importantly, it changed the
economics of global production generally. In information and communications
technology (ICT or IT)—the sector that makes up 94.9% of China’s high technology
exports and upon which this paper focuses3—the globalized, geographically
fragmented supply chain that distributes a huge variety of highly-specialized,
affordable devices would not be possible without China's novel capacity for “ultra
mass-flexible production.”4 It’s a capacity that foreign firms have put to highlyprofitable use even as changing dynamics made certain business models no longer
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Mary Hennock, China: The World’s Factory Floor, BBC (Nov. 11, 2002, 07:52 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2415241.stm.
For example, China’s share of global exports of telecommunications and office equipment rose from
around .08% in 1980 to approximately 34% in 2013, according to WTO statistics. See Statistics Database, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://stat.wto.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN 8 (Yale Univ. Press) (2011).
Its ability to cheaply churn out a huge variety of highly-specialized products using the same manufacturing infrastructure is exemplified in the Pearl River Delta’s Foxconn factories. See BREZNITZ &
MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN, supra note 3, at 13-16.
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feasible.
Just as China’s factories disrupted the economics of IT hardware, its research labs
could easily disrupt the economics of the technology itself. These economics are
driven by intellectual-property licensing and the adoption of technology standards
(a popular business aphorism in China has it that ‘‘third-rate companies build
products, second-rate companies build technology, first-rate companies build
standards.”5).
Despite the startling scale of China’s patent activity, which is explored in Part II,
there are reasons to think the Chinese IT industry—which is more structurally
inclined to view patents as an aspect of production rather than a free-standing
source of revenue—may leverage its rights differently than comparable western
firms, and the impact of integrating this massive new fount of intellectual property
into the global innovation economy remains to be seen.
Part III examines China’s increasingly assertive role in setting technology
standards, both at the national and international levels. Chinese standards-setting
organizations attracted significant international attention in the mid-to-late 2000s
when they began putting forward home-grown alternatives to market-dominant
technologies and expensive foreign patents. More recently, Chinese agencies have
put forward regulations that reflect a particularly militant stance on licensing terms
and on proprietary standards generally.
China’s burgeoning patent portfolio, providing currency to negotiate into and
around multinational patent pools, combined with the impact of its policies on
standards-setting norms, could shift the economics of patent monetization in
dramatic ways. Like previous market disruptions, China’s effect on the global
knowledge economy is likely to challenge some foreign firms and benefit others.

II. China’s Patent Boom
A. Indigenous Innovation
In February 2006, the State Council of China issued a document styled “The
National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan
(2006-2020).”6 Setting forth an ambitious transformational vision of a technology-

5.
6.

三流企业做产品; 二流企业做技术; 一流企业做标准. See Ying Zhan & Xuezhong Zhu, Intellectual Property Right Abuses in the Patent Licensing of Technology Standards, 10 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP.
187, 187-200 (2007).
Guójiā zhōng cháng qī kēxué hé jìshù fāzh ǎn guīhuà gāngyào (2006 -2020 Nián) (国家中长期科学和
技术发展规划纲要 (2006-2020年)) [The National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology

443

14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (2016)

centric Chinese economy by 2020,7 the Plan was quickly cited in the west as evidence
of China’s “techno-nationalist” agenda.8 In particular, the 15-Year Plan established
a new guiding principle for the country’s economic development: Zìzhǔ chuàngxīn (
自主创新) or “Indigenous Innovation.”9
The goal of the Indigenous Innovation push is to reduce China’s reliance on
foreign technology (from an estimated 60% in 2006 to less than 30% by 2020).10
Indigenous Innovation has since been promoted by government policy on both the
national and local level.11 In addition to direct R&D support through state-funded
research institutes, R&D investments by Chinese firms is encouraged through
government procurement, tax breaks, subsidies and other incentives.12 Indigenous
Innovation has also emphasized consolidating the fruits of this research through
increasing Chinese involvement both nationally and internationally in patent filing
and standard setting.13
B. Patent Activity in China: Growth and Scale
Measured in raw patents, China’s Indigenous Innovation has blown past
expectations. The 15-year Plan’s aim to increase domestic inventors’ share of annual
invention-patent grants from roughly 40% to 70%14 came achingly close to fruition
6 years ahead of schedule in 2014, with 69.8% of the 233,228 invention patents
granted by China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) awarded to domestic
applicants.15

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
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Development
Plan
(2006-2020)],
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm. Non-official translation available at http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/123(6).pdf
See China issues S&T development guidelines, THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_183426.htm.
Sylvia Schwaag Serger & Magnus Breidne, China’s Fifteen-Year Plan for Science and Technology:
An Assessment, 4 ASIA POLICY 135, 145-147 (2007); James McGregor, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’: A Web of Industrial Policies 6 (2010).
McGregor, supra note 8, at 13.
Serger & Breidne, supra note 8 at 147.
McGregor, supra note 8, at 17-19.
Id.
Id. at 26-30; Like R&D spending, it’s thought that China incentivizes patent activity by “financial
remuneration, tax breaks and other benefits offered by the government in exchange for the filing of
patents.” Chris Neumeyer, China’s Great Leap Forward in Patents, IPWATCHDOG (April 4, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/. See also
Patents, yes; ideas, maybe, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 (describing China’s “ecosystem of incentives for its people to file patents”).
The state’s role in stand setting is explored in Part III infra.
Serger & Breidne, supra note 8 at 147.
Comparative Table 1 Contemporary Quantity Comparison of Three Kinds of Patents Received from
Home and Domestic between 2013 and 2014 (2013-2014 SIPO Application Statistics), STATE INTELL.
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SIPO now receives more applications than any patent office in the world,16 with
928,177 invention-patent applications received in 2014.17 86.3% were from domestic
applicants.18 In addition to invention patents, China also grants a second type of
patent called a “utility model patent,” a category of intellectual property similar to
rights granted in Germany, Japan and other nations but absent from U.S. law.19
China received another 868,511 utility model applications in 2014 (99.1%
domestic),20 bringing the total number of SIPO patent applications (including design
patents) to a staggering 2.4 million.21 While utility models are often disparagingly
characterized as “petty patents” or “junk patents” due to the lower examination
standards they entail,22 they cover largely the same subject matter as invention
patents and are valid, enforceable intellectual property rights in China and
elsewhere.23
Meanwhile, Chinese patent activity has also boomed internationally. In 2013,
21,516 international Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications originated in
China,24 up from only 1,731 in 2005,25 an average annual growth rate of 36.7% (by
far the highest in the world),26 and making China the third most prolific country of
origin for PCT applications overall, behind only the United States and Japan.27

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

PROP.
OFF.
OF
THE
P.R.C.,
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2014/12/201502/t20150204_1071538.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS (2014),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2014.pdf.
Table 1 Distribution of Applications for Inventions Received from Home and Abroad: December 2014,
STATE INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2014/12/201502/t20150204_1071541.html.
Id.
Where
Can
Utility
Models
Be
Acquired?,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/where.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
Table 16 Distribution of Applications for Patents for Utility Model and Design Received from Home
and Abroad: December 2014, STATE INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2014/12/201502/t20150204_1071524.html.
Interestingly, these numbers seem to be leveling off. After a decade of double-digit annual growth,
the total number of patent applications actually slipped between 2013 and 2014 (mainly due to a
decline in design patent applications). State Intellectual Patent Office, supra note 15.
See Neumeyer, supra note 13; McGregor, supra note 8 at 26.
When Chinese electrical-equipment manufacturer Chint Group was sued for patent infringement in
Europe, it retaliated with a suit in Chinese court on the basis of its utility model patent. It was
awarded a $45 million judgment. Neumeyer, supra note 13.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT COOPERATION TREATY YEARLY REVIEW: THE INTERNATIONAL
PATENT SYSTEM (2014), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/patents/901/wipo_pub_901_2014.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 PCT YEARLY REVIEW].
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM IN 2005: PCT YEARLY REVIEW 3,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pct/en/activity/pct_2005.pdf.
2014 PCT YEARLY REVIEW, supra note 24.
While still significantly less than the U.S. and Japan (who together accounted for almost half of PCT
applications worldwide), China’s PCT activity is unique among countries WIPO classifies as “middle

445

14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (2016)

Chinese telecoms ZTE and Huawei were the second and third largest individual
filers respectively, trailing only Japan’s Panasonic.28 In the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), Chinese patent applications have soared 1,000% in the
last decade.29
These metrics come with inevitable caveats. Given the government incentives to
patent, many Chinese inventors may be filing just to file rather than to protect a
genuine innovation.30 Fewer SIPO patents are filed in multiple jurisdictions than
patents in other countries, further indication, perhaps, of their comparative lack of
quality.31 As for WIPO and USPTO applications originating in China, it’s been
pointed out that many of these are filed by multinational corporations with R&D
centers merely based in China, a testament more to the globalization of research
than to a surge in indigenous innovation.32
Nevertheless, given the sheer scale of Chinese patent activity, its sudden growth
seems bound to effect the economics of technology licensing one way or another.

III. Standards
A. Standards in China
Technical standards—model specifications or criteria that encourage uniformity
and compatibility within a given technical field—can have a dramatic impact on the
value/cost of patent rights.33 Where a standard is adopted that incorporates
propriety methods or configurations (a “closed” standard), licensing these rights
becomes mandatory for any business wishing to create a standard-compliant
product. The effect is particularly acute in IT, which, due to the nature of the oftencomplex systems involved, tends to evolve standards with multiple layers of
interlocking inventions.34
The Standardization Administration of China (SAC, 标准委), established in 2001
during the departmental reshuffling in anticipation of the country’s WTO accession,

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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income,” with nearest-rival India clocking in an order of magnitude lower at 1,392 applications. Id.
at 31.
Id. at 10.
Neumeyer, supra note 13; McGregor, supra note 8.
Patents, yes; ideas, maybe, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17257940.
Valuing Patents, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21569062-valuing-patents.
Lee Branstetter, Guangwei Li & Francisco Veloso, The Polyglot Patent Boom, 309 SCI. AM. 62, 62
(2013).
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1889, 1893 (2002).
See infra note 81.
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establishes national standards (国标, gúobiāo or GBs).35 GBs can either be
recommended or mandatory, though the latter is theoretically limited to standards
involving health or safety and those necessary to enforce other laws and
regulations.36 Of the 32,085 GBs listed in SAC’s database as of February 1, 2015,
about 12% (3,894) are mandatory.37 Where no GB has been set by SAC, other
ministries, such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT, the
ministry with responsibility for the IT sector) will set industry standards (业标, also
translated as “trade standards”), which can also be either recommended or
mandatory.38
In addition, SAC represents China within international standard-setting
organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).39
Chinese involvement in international standards setting has become increasingly
vigorous. As of February 1, 2015, SAC participates in 737 of ISO’s technical
committees (for comparison, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the
corresponding U.S. body, participates in 607),40 and initiatives by research bodies
such as the China National Institute for Standardization (CNIS) focusing on
increasing domestic expertise in standards development suggest a strong national
commitment to increasing Chinese input into future international standardization
efforts.41
In contrast to the U.S. approach to technical standards, standards setting in
China is unambiguously a matter of state policy. Unlike ANSI, a private non-profit
organization, SAC is closely supervised by China’s State Council and is usually
considered an arm of the state for all practical purposes.42 Indeed, China’s 1989
Standardization Law explicitly charges the government with responsibility for

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

See generally STANDARDIZATION ADMIN. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://www.sac.gov.cn/sacen (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Biāozhǔnhuà Fǎ (中华人民共和国标准化法 ) [STANDARDIZATION LAW]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1988, effective Apr. 1, 1989), ch.
3, art. 7 (China). For concerns about China’s mandatory GBs, see infra p. 13.
National Standard Query (国家标准查询 ), STANDARDIZATION ADMIN. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA [hereinafter SAC National Standard Query], http://www.sac.gov.cn/SACSearch/outlinetemplet/gjbzcx.jsp (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
STANDARDIZATION LAW, ch. 3, art. 2; see also DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, U.S.-CHINA
ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS: NEW NORMS IN OLD
INSTITUTIONS 3 (2013) [hereinafter BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA], available at
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/RiseofChinainTechnologyStandards.pdf
ISO Members, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
Id.
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38, at 50.
Id. at 16.
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formulating and implementing technical standards.43
B. Standards and Protectionism
Given the Chinese government’s active role in standards setting and its
undisguised goal of fostering indigenous innovation, critics inevitably see the efforts
of Chinese SSOs as animated by a protectionist agenda, especially where those
efforts lead to national standards which differ from international ones.44 For more
than a decade, the United States has repeatedly reiterated its concerns that “China
seems to be actively pursuing the development of unique requirements, despite the
existence of well-established international standards, as a means for protecting
domestic companies from competing foreign standards and technologies.”45
The U.S. preoccupation with China’s “unique requirements” is more than just
grousing, since a country’s adoption of national technical standards can implicate its
WTO commitments. In particular, China is subject to the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”). The TBT Agreement explicitly extends to both
“technical regulations” (i.e. mandatory standards) and “standards” (i.e. voluntary
standards) the core WTO principles prohibiting discriminatory trade practices46 and
unnecessarily trade-restrictive regulations.47 More importantly, it creates an
43.
44.

45.

46.

47.
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STANDARDIZATION LAW, ch. 1, art. 3.
See Osama Hussain & Dennis Fernandez, Strategic Intellectual Property and Emerging Standards
for Entering the Chinese Market, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1 (2005) (attributing China’s actions “establishing high technology standards that differ from the international community” to “a policy to obtain
its own domestic intellectual property rights”).
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 65 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 USTR REPORT]. A nearly-identical line has been trotted out on a yearly basis by
the USTR in its annual reports to Congress since at least 2003. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 36 (2003) (“China is actively pursuing the development of unique requirements, despite the existence of well-established international standards.
This course of action will create significant barriers to entry into its markets, as the cost of compliance will be high for foreign companies.”).
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement] (“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”); TBT Agreement art. 4.1, Annex 3 ¶ E (tasking Member States with ensuring that SSOs within their territories
abide by the same principle with respect to standards). This rule essentially extends the most-favored-nation and national-treatment principles of Article I and Article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
TBT Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2.2. (“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade . . . .”); Id. art. 4.1, Annex 3 ¶ E. (tasking Member States with ensuring that SSOs
within their territories abide by the same principle with respect to standards). This reiterates the
principles articulated in GATT Article XX that government measures must not be a “means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade” and must be
“necessary” to accomplish some legitimate purpose (though the TBT Agreement provides only a non-
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additional obligation on member states to use “relevant international standards . . .
as a basis for” setting national standards,48 reflecting member consensus that—
regardless of whether divergent technical standards are discriminatory trade
obstacles per se—uniform standards facilitate trade by, for example, encouraging
economies of scale.49
In terms of treaty interpretation, tension between the U.S. and China tends to
center around what constitutes a “relevant international standard” for purposes of
the TBT Agreement.50 China takes the position that only inter-governmental
organizations like ISO can set international standards triggering TBT obligations,
whereas the U.S. insists that the Agreement includes industry standards set by
NGOs such as IEEE.51 In any event, however, the U.S. and other critics of alleged
Chinese protectionism point to examples of national standards that would violate
WTO/TBT principles under either criteria.52
China, for its part, sees technical trade barriers differently. Flipping the script,
Chinese commentators have implied that the threat to free trade lies less in allowing
competing national standards and more in imposing a uniform international
standard that entails paying mandatory rents to entrenched (western) market
participants.53
C. WAPI, TD-SCMA,
Standards

EVD

and

China’s

Other

Non-Conforming

The vast majority of Chinese standards are based upon international or foreign

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

exclusive list of legitimate objectives, whereas GATT Article XX’s exceptions are exhaustive). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 1986 U.N.T.S. 194.
TBT Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2.4; Id. art. 4.1, Annex 3 ¶ F (standards).
TBT Agreement, supra note 46, Preface (recognizing the importance of international standards in
“improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade”); see also
Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns of
Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403,
1464 (2007).
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38, at 12-13.
Id.
See infra part II.C for discussion of WAPI. Wi-fi is an ISO standard, and therefore the only plausible
legal defense of the non-conforming WAPI standard is that it fits within the security-interest exception to the TBT Agreement.
See Review on Technology Barriers Related with Intellectual Property, SIMMTESTER.COM (Dec. 17,
2003),
http://www.simmtester.com/page/news/showpubnews.asp?title=Review+on+Technology+Barriers+Related+with+Intellectual+Property&num=103 (“[T]echnology standard[s] [have] become a barrier for importing goods”); see Ying Zhan & Xuezhong Zhu, IPR Abuses in the Patent Licensing of Technology Standards, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 187-200, 187 note 5 (2007).
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standards or are otherwise uncontroversial.54 In fact—according to the 2013 report
prepared by Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission—of the tens of thousands of Chinese standards
developed “in the last fifteen years to 2010, there were only twenty controversial or
unique standards, all in ICT.”55 Nevertheless, these handful of IT standards have
caused significant consternation, possibly because IT is a particularly globalized
industry where interoperability is particularly crucial.56
The most often-cited grievance57 is China’s advocacy of WLAN Authentication
and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI), a wireless security protocol calculated to
address widely-acknowledged vulnerabilities in Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP),
formerly the security specification for the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard (a/k/a WiFi).58 In 2003, SAC and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII, MIIT’s
predecessor) adopted WAPI as a mandatory encryption standard for wireless devices
sold in China.59 However, following complaints by the U.S. and resulting bilateral
trade talks, this mandate was abandoned in 2004 before it was ever implemented.60
China then began to push for adoption of WAPI as an international standard by
ISO, but the technology was rejected in favor of a security protocol put forward by
IEEE known as 802.11i (eventually implemented as WPA2).61 Still, China clung to
WAPI, appealing ISO’s decision,62 promoting the technology through alternative
channels,63 and even resubmitting the standard for international consideration as

54.

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38, at 34-35, n. 28. Of the 32,085 GBs listed
in SAC’s database as of February 1, 2015, 13,233 purport to be adoptions of standards set by international SSOs (mostly ISO or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)); SAC National
Standard Query, supra note 37.
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38, n. 28.
Andrew Updegrove, ICT Standard Setting Today: A System Under Stress, 6 CONSORTIUM
STANDARDS BULLETIN 4 (Apr. 2007), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/bulletins/apr07.php#feature
(noting that “[u]nlike physical products, the fruits of ICT technologies require a large number of
interoperability standards in order to function and flourish” and that, due to the global nature of
trade, travel, production and utilization, “[i]n ICT in particular, the concept of a national standard
has become archaic.”).
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38, at 23; see also, e.g., USTR 2014 REPORT,
supra note 45, at 65-66; Hussain & Fernandez, supra note 44, at 2; Gibson, supra note 49; McGregor,
supra note 8.
For a detailed history of WAPI from 2003-2006, see generally Brian J. DeLacey et al., Government
Intervention in Standardization: The Case of WAPI (Sept. 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract-930930.
Id. at 11-12.
Id.
Id. at 13-15.
Id.
For example, in 2009, all three of China’s mobile carriers included WAPI-capability as a requirement
for handsets on their networks. Government influence was widely suspected. See Owen Fletcher,
Years on, China Pushes WAPI in Mobile Phones, CIO (May 8, 2009), http://www.cio.com/article/2428329/infrastructure/years-on--china-pushes-wapi-in-mobile-phones.html.
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recently as 2009.64
Given the technology’s distinctively home-grown character and the government’s
dogged support for it in the face of international political and commercial
resistance,65 it’s no wonder that WAPI is the poster child for China’s use of standards
in the service of techno-nationalism.66 However, it’s probably appropriate to think of
WAPI as something of an outlier.67 It is a fixation that China developed while its
new standardization regime was in its infancy and one that is arguably rooted as
much in the security paranoia of particular state actors as in a broad national
economic policy designed to give domestic companies a leg up.68
Past WAPI, China’s controversial IT standards become more nuanced. For one
thing, these “Chinese” standards often incorporate significant amounts of foreign
technology, making their effectiveness questionable as pure tools of technonationalism.69 Moreover, in nearly every case, government efforts to promote the
standard have been far from unequivocal and have failed to result in the commercial
success that Indigenous Innovation proponents supposedly crave.70
For example, a continued point of contention in Chinese-U.S. trade relations is
the Chinese government’s role in 3G mobile technology, where it has consistently
given preferential treatment to the TD-SCDMA71 standard over competing
standards like CDMA2000 and W-CDMA.72 It’s a dispute that appears to be
following the mobile industry into the next generation, as China is accused of
preferentially licensing 4G spectrum to companies using the favored TD-LTE
standard at the expense of the disfavored FDD-LTE standard.73
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See Watch Out: WAPI is back on the Wi-Fi agenda, EE TIMES (June 19, 2009), available at
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1254041.
WAPI has failed to be adopted by consumers even in China, where “laptop users almost universally
use Wi-Fi in coffee shops to surf the Web.” Fletcher, supra note 63.
See, e.g. Zia K. Cromer, China's WAPI policy: security measure or trade protectionism?, 4 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 1 (2005); Richard P. Suttmeier, A New Technonationalism? China and the Development
of Technical Standards, 48 COMMC’N OF THE ACM 35 (2005), available at http://china-us.uoregon.edu/pdf/newTechnNatChina.pdf.
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN, supra note 3, n.37.
Id. at n.15 (quoting a “long-time observer of Chinese standards” as speculating that the WAPI case
arose as a “result of pressures from parts of former military bureaucracies which had been absorbed
into MIIT but not Assimilated”).
Id. at 37 (TD-SCMA, discussed infra notes, incorporates 148 patents, of which only 30% are owned
by Chinese firms).
Id.
Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access.
2014 USTR REPORT 2014, supra note 45, at 66-67.
According to the 2014 USTR Report, “In November 2013, however, China licensed 4G spectrum in a
manner that is not technology neutral, as it licensed only the domestically favored Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standard known as LTE-TDD and not the other common standard known as LTEFDD.” Id.
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Yet, at no point have “foreign” telephony standards been actually excluded from
China. As with other divergent Chinese standards, market forces are frequently
enough to outweigh whatever favoritism is inconsistently bestowed by the state.74
Government favor (not to mention arguably superior technology) has not been
enough to keep China Mobile’s TD-SCDMA network from losing market share to
China Telecom’s CDMA2000 network and China Unicom’s WCDMA network.75
Though currently market-dominant in 4G, China Mobile’s TD-LTE network will face
increasing competition in 2015 as China Telecom rolls out its FDD-LTE network76
and China Unicom expands its mixed TD/FDD network.77 Regardless of which
standard wins out, it is unlikely to be a satisfying victory for Indigenous Innovation,
since both 4G specifications are multinational in origin and, in fact, are identical in
90 percent of their core technology.78
Similarly, in the field of video compression, efforts to develop alternative
standards to DVD and Blu-Ray—encouraged directly by the Chinese government—
led to the introduction of EVD (Enhanced Versatile Disc) and CBHD (China Blue
High Definition), respectively.79 Both standards incorporated significant amounts of
foreign technology and neither enjoyed much commercial success, even within
China.80
WAPI aside, China’s willingness to let its homegrown technologies (to the extent
they can be described as such) founder suggests that its standards agenda is more
complicated than simply fostering Indigenous Innovation for its own sake. While the
policies of the Chinese state are obviously multi-faceted, the primary driver of its
aggressive involvement in standards setting may not be protectionism, at least in
the narrow sense of sheltering particular domestic industries. And, whether or not
by design, the more striking effect of this push may be to nudge international norms
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

79.
80.
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towards a paradigm more broadly favorable to China’s economic interests and
perhaps more consonant with Chinese attitudes towards proprietary technology
generally.
D. Standardization and Its Discontents
China’s manufacturing industry, the engine of its economic miracle, is haunted
by the threat of ballooning production costs due to patent royalties, their alreadythin profit margins choked by the increasingly dense foliage of the modern patent
thicket.81
This concern is illustrated especially well in the digital-video cases mentioned
above. By 2003, China was manufacturing 75% of the world’s DVD players.82
However, adhering to DVD’s rigid video-encoding standards meant paying
substantial patent royalties to the Japanese, American and European companies
that had developed and (in the Chinese view) imposed the standard
internationally.83 With no leverage to negotiate lower rates for this monopolized
asset, fierce price competition and the high variable costs of this production input
drove profits down to one dollar per unit by 2004.84 The development of EVD, while
ultimately a commercial failure, broke DVD’s monopoly, and the presence of a muchcheaper competitor drastically drove down licensing rates for the embedded
technology.85 A similar sequence played out with Blu-Ray and CBHD.86
Using competing technologies to force royalty concessions—effectively, driving
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See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA, supra note 38 at 2. Once again, this concern is
especially acute with respect to ICT, which, by its nature, not only requires a particularly high degree
of interoperability—supra note 38 at 2—but also usually incorporates a particularly weighty catalogue of patented technology, particularly software. See Andrew Updegrove, ICT Standard Setting
Today: A System Under Stress, 6 CONSORTIUM STANDARDS BULL. (2007), available at
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/bulletins/apr07.php#feature (ICT standards unusually susceptible to
infringing patents). While the causes are disputed, the staggering increase in software patents is
undeniable. See James E. Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents 26 (B.U. Sch. of Law Working
Paper No. 11-31, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868979 (showing the annual grant of U.S. software patents rising from less than 5,000 for most of the 1980’s to nearly 40,000 in 2009). The sheer
number of patents in circulation increases the risk that patent thickets will coalesce, potentially
choking innovation, especially where standards are involved. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON.
119, 121-22 (2001).
See Breznitz & Murphree, Innovation in China, supra note 79, at 206.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Prior to EVD, Chinese manufacturers were paying around $21 per unit to license DVD technology.
EVD rates were set at $2/unit, eventually causing DVD patent owners to lower rates to $12$13.50/unit. Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 210-11.
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down price by increasing supply—arguably explains much of the Chinese push for
alternative technology standards.87 But it’s merely one aspect of a larger tension. As
a consequence of Chinese firms’ position in the global supply chain and possibly also
of more intangible cultural attitudes towards proprietary technology,88 Chinese
standardization policy mitigates the perceived commercial drag created when
manufacturers are compelled to lease intellectual property rights simply for
purposes of international compatibility.
E. SAC goes FRAND
The problems created by the interplay of standards and patents are well-known.
Because the adoption of a standard, particularly a de jure mandatory standard,
shelters technology choice from pure market forces, standard-essential patents
(SEPs) are potential windfalls for the owners and inefficient taxes for the users.89 In
particular, SEP owners can “hold up” manufacturers and consumers, demanding
license terms that the value of their technology on its own would never warrant, a
problem compounded where a multitude of rights-holders creates “patent stacking”
issues.90
As a result, many SSOs have guidelines incorporating—to varying degrees—
FRAND or RAND commitments: rules that usually require members to disclose any
SEP and to commit to licensing on (Fair), Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory
terms.91
As previously noted, Chinese commentators often regard technology standards as
themselves potential “technical barriers” to trade.92 The Chinese delegation to the
WTO has repeatedly raised the argument that mandatory imposition of proprietary
technology standards hampers international trade and that patents in international
standards should be subject to some form of FRAND licensing if adherence to those
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standards is to be mandatory under the TBT Agreement,93 a seemingly
straightforward position that the U.S. insists it cannot even comprehend.94
On the national level, much to the consternation of the U.S. Trade
Representative, China has emphasized developing standards that rely either on
public-domain technology or technology that can be made available at reduced
rates.95 SAC circulated several draft regulations on patents and standardization,
each taking an incrementally more placatory tone in relation to international IP
concerns, in 2004, 2009 and 2012.96 All three drafts are clear in principle: patents
don’t belong in mandatory national standards.97 Under the 2004 and 2009 drafts,
moreover, where a mandatory standard simply must include patented technology,
the patent-holder would have been required to negotiate a resolution with SAC,
presumably involving a reduced-fee license, and, alarmingly, when such a resolution
could not be reached, SAC had authority to impose a compulsory royalty-free
license.98 In voluntary standards, the earlier proposed regulations would have
permitted patented technology only if essential and only if owners of standardessential patents signed a written declaration agreeing to license their technology
on a royalty-free or “substantially lower[ed]” reduced-fee, FRAND basis.99
The 2012 draft dropped SAC’s compulsory-license remedy in cases of mandatory
standards (requiring only negotiation with relevant departments, failing which the
standard will be put on hold) and removed the “substantially lower” royalty
requirement for SEP-licensing declarations (requiring only that licenses be “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” (公平合理无歧视)).100 These regulations were
finally enacted, substantially unaltered, as the Interim Regulatory Measures on
National Standards Involving Patents (“Measures on National Standards”), issued

93.
94.

Gibson, supra note 49, at 1429-1435.
After thoroughly reviewing the concerns raised by the Chinese delegation, the U.S.’s representative
“could not see any such relationship” between SEP hold ups and the TBT Agreement’s focus on removing technical barriers to trade. Id. at 1431.
95. 2014 USTR REPORT, supra note 45, at 69. The USTR frames such reduced rates as below market,
though, of course, the point of RAND licensing terms is to correct the market disruption caused by
standardization.
96. D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 19-23 (2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335664.
97. Id. at 20, 21, 23.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 国家标准委 国家知识产权局关于发 布《国家标准涉及专利的管理规定 (暂行 )》的公告, [State Provisional Rules on National Standards Involving Patents] (promulgated by the Nat’l Standardization
Comm. of the State Intellectual Prop. Office, Dec. 19, 2013, effective Jan. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=337261.
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jointly by SAC and SIPO and effective January 1, 2014.101
While greeted with wary positivity internationally—at least in comparison to
previous proposals102—the Measures on National Standards are striking in their
commitment to defanging patents. Under the regulations, mandatory GBs will never
incorporate patented technology unless SAC cuts a deal with the patent holder,
effectively ensuring that proprietary technical standards will always, one way or
another, be subject to competition (and teeing China up for another WTO/TBT
dispute if it decides to mandate a standard in a field where an international
standard does incorporate patent rights). Furthermore, while FRAND commitments
are a common tool among SSOs, “reasonable” is a notoriously slippery legal
standard, and it remains to be seen how SAC—given its declared hostility towards
SEPs generally—will interpret this requirement.
Chinese courts have already addressed FRAND commitments in the context of
the 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), China’s recently-enacted national antitrust
law.103 Standardization and patent licensing raise antitrust concerns in many
jurisdictions.104 However, the AML is unique among comparable laws in specifically
addressing intellectual property rights, the “abuse” (滥用 ) of which can constitute a
violation,105 and AML guidelines recently issued by the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) emphasize that abusive licensing practices—
including charging “unfairly high prices”—can constitute an abuse of market
dominance in violation of the AML.106
In a suit by Chinese telecom giant Huawei107 against InterDigital, a U.S. company
101. SIPO, 国家标准涉及专利的管理规定 (暂行) [Interim Regulatory Measures on National Standards Involving Patents] , available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/yw/2013/201401/t20140124_900699.html Nonofficial
English
translation
available
at
http://sunsteinlaw.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013_01_IP_Update_PRC.pdf.
102. See e.g. Letter from Richard Phillips, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Assoc., to Zhang Chengyu,
Standardization Admin. of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013.01.18_IPO_Comments_on_SAC_Regulatory_Measures_on_National_Standards
_Involving_Patents.pdf
103. Sokol & Zheng, supra note 96, at 27-34.
104. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1889, 1901-03 (2002).
105. Sokol & Zheng, supra note 96, at 10-11. Article 55 of the AML states that the law does not apply to
companies exercising their intellectual property rights unless it is to restrict competition through
abuse of those rights. Thus, the AML provisions with respect to monopolistic agreements (Articles
13-16) and abuse of market dominance (Articles 17-19) could apply to patent licensing. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa(中华人民共和国反垄断法 ) [Antimonopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 517,
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm.
106. Sokol & Zheng, supra note 96, at 11-13.
107. As of 2012, Huawei is the largest telecommunications equipment maker in the world. Who’s afraid
of Huawei?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21559922.
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that develops and monetizes wireless technology, the Guangdong High People’s
Court found that InterDigital’s proposed license terms for its SEPs violated Articles
17 and 55 of the AML.108 It also found that, under Chinese law, the license terms
failed to comply with InterDigital’s FRAND commitments arising from its
participation in the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
standard-setting process.109 Notably, the court imposed a royalty rate calculated by
some commentators as “orders of magnitudes lower” than the rate commanded by
other telecom SEPs.110
More recently, Nokia was pressured to commit to licensing its patents on FRAND
terms in order to gain the approval for their acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent from
Chinese regulators (the last holdouts among major national antitrust regulators),
who feared the deal would concentrate too many SEPs in the hands of a single
company.111
Such aggressive interpretations of FRAND represent a stark departure from
current global norms. Like the efforts to develop alternative standards discussed in
III.B and III.C supra, new Chinese regulations like the Measures on National
Standards and Article 55 of the AML appear calculated to drive a new patentlicensing paradigm, one where the power of SEPs is greatly diminished, the leverage
of patentees neutralized and royalty rates drastically reduced. Given China’s robust
participation in international standard setting and its undeniable centrality to the
global economy, companies at all levels of the innovation supply chain would do well
to heed the Chinese vision.

IV. A Patent Portfolio with Chinese Characteristics
Given the increasing number of Chinese patent holders, perhaps Chinese SSOs
will begin to receive domestic pushback if they impose overly austere FRAND terms.
Conventional wisdom, after all, has suggested that China’s reverence for intellectual
property rights will blossom in proportion to its own intellectual property
holdings.112
The profile of Chinese applicants, however, may make them less inclined to drive
108.
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110.
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hard bargains in licensing their patents. In contrast to the U.S., many are
universities and research centers who are motivated to pursue and patent their
research and to participate in standards development by factors other than the
ability to aggressively monetize their IP rights, for example, by acquiring prestige,
tenure, state benefits, or the all-important Chinese intangible guanxi.113
Even profit-driven Chinese tech companies tend to be less focused on pursuing a
technology-licensing-based business model than are their European or U.S.
counterparts.114 The Chinese companies with large R&D capacities tend to derive
most of their revenue from selling tangible goods and are therefore more ambivalent
about policies that might lower the cost of patent licenses, which they often view
more as production inputs rather than products unto themselves. 115
Nevertheless, Chinese firms are not indifferent to their patent portfolios. One
solution to the problems associated with patent thickets—the risks and transaction
costs associated with fields like IT involving large numbers of potentially blocking
patents—is cross-licensing and the creation of “patent pools,” agreements whereby
multiple patent holders agree to grant the licenses to multiple patents to one another
or to third parties as a package.116 Patent pools are crucial in IT due to the
particularly dense collection of complementary patents necessary to implement a
single technology.117
However, patent pools can also have anti-competitive effects, and Chinese firms
have long complained of being shut out of Western patent pools and charged
exorbitant royalty rates by collusive patent cabals.118 Since IT patent pools often
bundle together potentially substitutive technologies, the companies involved are
accused of, effectively, price-fixing.119 Stockpiling a patent arsenal of their own may
advantage Chinese IT companies in a variety of ways: gaining entrance to patentpool negotiations, setting up competing pools, putting downward pressure on prices,
and generally providing a counter-deterrent to aggressive strategic IP behavior by
foreign firms.
For these purposes, the supposed lack of quality of Chinese patent applications120
may matter less than their sheer quantity. Individual patents within a pool often
have little or no value by themselves.121 Furthermore, software patents—a core
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component of the intellectual property rights involved in IT—have classically
unpredictable boundaries, making their inclusion in patent pools less a matter of
technical necessity than of addressing the risk of inadvertent infringement.122 All
that’s needed is to find a sufficient number of patents with the theoretical potential
to hold up a standard or provide substitutes for some of the claims that the standard
incorporates.
Between increased Chinese participation in international patent pools, competing
patent pools dominated by Chinese technology and increased pressure to impose
strict FRAND commitments on standards, it may become more difficult in the near
future for IT patent holders to obtain the same rents they have sought in the past.
For companies built around developing and exporting the fruits of R&D, this could
be destabilizing.
For others, though, it could be a boon. Hardware factories in the Pearl River Delta
aren’t the only companies that rely on patented technologies as a production input
and who may be inclined to view high stacked royalties as a burden and patent
thickets as a source of risk and inefficient transaction costs. Moreover, research, like
production before it, is becoming a geographically fragmented global activity.
Multinational corporations increasingly make use of the cheap engineering talent
available in China’s research hubs.123 Thus, while the bounties of innovation may
fall, the costs could drop in tandem.

V. Conclusion
China’s patent and standards activity has the potential to dramatically affect the
global tech economy. However, the impact is likely to be more complex than that
suggested either by the dream of indigenous innovation promoted in China or by the
threat of techno-nationalism decried in the west.
Though perhaps motivated in part by a desire to raise retaliatory trade barriers
in response to perceived trade barriers created by Western companies, China’s
development of alternative technical standards is just as important in pressuring
SEP rights holders—both foreign and domestic—into concessions on licensing
terms. It is a strategy that dovetails with the apparent policy priorities of Chinese
representatives at international SSOs and with the aggressive Anti-Monopoly Law
and Standardization regulations recently enacted at the national level.
Meanwhile, absorbing a massive influx of Chinese brainpower into the globalized
122. Bessen, supra note 81, at 10-11.
123. BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN, supra note 3, at 106-08. See also Branstetter, Li
& Veloso, supra note 32.
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research supply chain and into international patent pools seems likely to both
increase the scale of these pools and to promote greater involvement by the
producers of actual technology products, parties with an interest in lowering rather
than maximizing royalty rates.
Just as there were winners and losers when the world economy was disrupted by
cheap Chinese manufactured goods, the sudden surge in Chinese intellectual
property will hurt some foreign firms and help others. Companies whose businesses
are built around extracting large bounties from their blocking patents may find their
profit margins harder to maintain. On the other hand, companies on the
consumption end of tech licenses may benefit from cheaper inputs and reduced
transaction costs, and large multinationals may wring productivity dividends from
another shift towards geographic fragmentation, this time in research rather than
production.
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